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which are referred to by the umbrella term “domestic rule of law.” The resulting process of policy convergence
is further aided by socialization. Socialization may involve emulation of policies of similar states or “active”
learning through norm entrepreneurs, who use the reference groups for both evaluation and access to their
target audiences. I capture the theorized spatial processes using a multiparametric spatiotemporal
autoregressive model (m-STAR) and find support for the prediction.
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I develop a theory of spatial policy diffusion, where “space” is conceptualized as shared
memberships in economic international organizations (IOs). I argue diffusion is driven by two
complementary causal mechanisms: competition and socialization. Outside evaluators, such as
international leaders, activists, and most importantly, international firms and investors, often
assess states’ attractiveness as a business venue by comparing them to similar states. The natural
reference group for such comparisons are not just geographical neighbors, but also states with
shared memberships in economic IOs. Responding to this evaluation, states identify members
of their own reference groups and view them as competition for investment. As a result, states
within the same reference groups converge on issues related to lowering domestic economic
risks, which are referred by the umbrella term “domestic rule of law.” Socialization operates
through norm entrepreneurs, who use the reference groups for both evaluation and access to
their target audiences. Economic IOs provide particularly useful channels for socialization by
maintaining permanent headquarters or hosting regular meetings among members. Likewise,
norm entrepreneurs tend to target states with similar levels of economic development. I capture
the theorized spatial processes using a multi-parametric spatio-temporal autoregressive model
(m-STAR) and find support for the predictions.
∗Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the 2011 Midwest Political Science Association Annual
Meeting in Chicago, the 2011 Annual Meeting of Political Methodology at Princeton, and the 2011 Visions in Method-
ology at Ohio State. I would like to thank all of those conferences’ participants for their helpful and constructive
feedback. I would also like to thank Sara Mitchell, Fred Boehmke, Robert Franzese, Dwayne Woods, Michelle Dion,
Aya Kachi, Amanda Murdie, Courtenay Conrad, Doug Dion, Kelly Kadera, John Conybeare, Bill Reisinger, Jon
Pevehouse, and Mark Nieman.
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Introduction
Ukraine’s pro-Moscow President Yanukovich’s abrupt withdrawal from the negotiations for an eco-
nomic Association Treaty with the European Union in the fall of 2013 set off a chain of the most
violent and bloody events in history of the former Soviet country since WWII. In the wake of
massive protests culminating in Yanukovich’s ouster, Russia undertook several actions—occupying
the Crimean peninsula, amassing troops on the border, and orchestrating civil violence—to prevent
the strengthening of economic ties between Ukraine and the EU, and instead push Ukraine towards
joining its Eurasian currency union.1 Yet neither the brutal repression of protesters nor Russian
aggression could deter the pro-EU protesters and activists, for whom a closer relationship with
the EU meant hope for legal reform, economic opportunities, and an end to rampant corruption.2
How justified were these hopes? Do memberships in economic international organizations (IOs)
have an effect on domestic economic conditions and to what extent? To answer this question, this
paper provides a theoretical and empirical evaluation of the relationship between memberships in
economic IOs and domestic rule of law.
This paper contributes to the study of policy diffusion by zeroing in on its one particular non-
geographical channel—shared membership in economic IOs—and exploring its effects. I argue that
shared membership in economic IOs is especially relevant for the diffusion of rule of law, which
is defined as domestic level of property protections, banking and insurance laws, and contractual
enforcement (Souva, Smith and Rowan 2008). Building on the existing spatial diffusion theories, I
argue that membership in economic IOs serves as an important channels for policy diffusion, often
even more important than geographical proximity. IOs create favorable settings for the operation
of the two policy diffusion mechanisms—competition and socialization.3 States with shared IO
memberships exhibit convergence in their domestic levels of rule of law as a result of these two
processes. First, states work to “keep up” with their fellow IO members to remain competitive for
trade, investment, and other international benefits. Second, IOs act as “teachers” of rule of law,
1The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, set to officially be implemented in 2015, consists of Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan, with Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as other possible members.
2Corporate raiding, or seizure of foreign and domestic firms (based on technical or fabricated charges) with the
intent of subsequently awarding them to plaintiffs or government officials, are endemic within Ukraine and have been
called a “cancerous tumor on the economy” by Yanukovich, though such actions often take place with the tacit or
even explicit cooperation of regional and national officials (Associated Press 2012). Moreover, in 2013, the US Trade
Representative labeled Ukraine a “Priority Foreign Country”—the lowest category for US intellectual property right
protections—a distinction that had not been issued in 11 years (BBC News 2013).
3Coercion may also serve as a mechanism for policy diffusion; however, I argue below that this mechanism is
beyond the scope of this study, due to the structure of the available data.
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either as their main mission or by creating favorable fora and access for policy entrepreneurs.4
It is noteworthy that, while all of these processes may take place among geographically prox-
imate states, an important distinction between IO-led and geographically-driven policy diffusion
lies in the intent. While geographical location is acquired by fiat, IO memberships are carefully
and strategically chosen and negotiated. This suggests, although certainly does not guarantee, that
states may be more susceptible to IO-led policy diffusion than to that which is merely driven by
their position on the map. The opening example of Ukraine provides some anecdotal support of
the importance of IO membership for a country’s domestic economic climate: Ukraine, a European
country with close historical ties to Eastern neighbors, hopes to remedy its poor legal and economic
conditions by forging closer ties with the EU rather than remaining within the Russian sphere by
joining the Eurasian Economic Union.
I conduct a systematic test of the research hypothesis on data that combines state memberships
in economic IOs (Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom 2004) and domestic level of rule of law. I
measure and isolate the effect of shared memberships in economic IOs from that of geography using a
spatial lags model, by taking advantage of recent advances in spatial econometrics (Beck, Gleditsch
and Beardsley 2006; Franzese and Hays 2007, 2008; Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010). The dependent
variable—state’s domestic level of rule of law enforcement—is operationalized and measured in two
alternative ways. First, I operationalize rule of law in terms of judicial independence and employ
a measure developed by Linzer and Staton (2012) (L&S). L&S rule of law measure is produced
by applying Bayesian factor analysis to a number of existing measures of rule of law and judicial
independence, such as Henisz (2000), CIRI (Cingranelli and Richards 2010), and Tate and Keith
(2007). Such an approach allows for addressing the challenges, associated with measuring rule of
law, such as temporal dependence, boundedness in the latent quantity, substantial missingness,
and measurement error in the observable indicators (Linzer and Staton 2012; R´ıos-Figueroa and
Staton 2012). I also operationalize rule of law using Standard and Poor (S&P) credit ratings, which
is a common measure of country creditworthiness, used by international investors and economic
institutions. Although S&P ratings are only available for a subset of the data, using this measure
serves as a robustness check for the main results.
The results corroborate the research hypotheses. Specifically, when evaluated in isolation from
each other, both geographical proximity and shared membership in economic IOs have a statisti-
4Some scholars separate socialization into learning, emulation, and social contagion. While important, this dis-
tinction is not theoretically crucial for the purposes of this paper. As a result, I use the word “socialization” as an
umbrella term for the three processes, and when necessary, refer to each of the processes individually.
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cally significant effect on policy diffusion. Evaluating the two mechanisms within a single empirical
model, however, reveals that accounting for shared memberships in economic IOs weakens or alto-
gether negates the effect of geographical proximity. I conclude that economic IOs serve as a more
salient reference group for policy diffusion than that created by mere geographical proximity. When
formulating domestic policies, states do not simply imitate those of their geographical neighbors,
but the neighbors with whom they share memberships in economic IOs. Present-day Poland, for
example, is more likely to “borrow” policy insights from its fellow members of the European Union,
such as Germany or Spain, than from Ukraine or Russia. Despite the shared borders, cultural ties,
and significant trade flows with the latter, Poland is much closer to its fellow EU members, when
it comes to policy goals. The analysis of substantive effects further clarifies the results.
The paper proceeds in the following way. I start by summarizing the existing literature on the
two complementary mechanisms for policy diffusion—competition and socialization. While these
mechanisms are most frequently discussed in the context of geographical diffusion, I demonstrate
that economic IOs provide a more pertinent channel for diffusion of rule of law. Next, I describe
the research design and test the research hypotheses using a multi-parametric spatio-temporal
autoregressive model (m-STAR). Consistent with the theory, I find that both shared memberships
in economic IOs and geographical proximity stimulate policy diffusion, albeit the former’s effect
is stronger and more robust to empirical specifications. I supplement the primary analyses with
graphs of substantive effects. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of these results.
Spatial Diffusion
Temporal and spatial clustering of political outcomes has long drawn scholarly attention. The
“waves” of democratization, Colored Revolutions in the post-Soviet space, and most recently, the
Arab Spring all hint at a possibility for international “spillover” or “contagion” of domestic-level
outcomes.5 Inspired by these empirical observations, international relations (IR) scholars have
produced an impressive body of research on spatial policy diffusion.
Much of the existing diffusion literature focuses on geographical or regional diffusion (e.g.,
Colaresi and Thompson 2003; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Linos 2011; Simmons 2000). More recently,
5More precisely, diffusion is one of the three possible explanations for spatial and temporal outcome clustering. The
other two—common exposure, or similar unit-level response to the same external stimulus, and homophily, or similar
units self-selecting into similar outcomes (Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010)—are beyond the immediate theoretical
scope of this paper. This paper’s modeling strategy for controlling for these competing explanatory factors is discussed
in Research Design.
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there has also been a growing interest in non-geographical spatial connectivity, which brought
into the spotlight such alternative channels of diffusion as shared IO memberships, economic ties,
political similarity, or shared historical and cultural ties (e.g., Cao 2009, 2010; Eichengreen and
Leblang 2008; Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010; Pevehouse 2005; Torfason and Ingram 2010; Berndt
and Woods 2013a,b; Zhukov and Stewart 2013).
Drawing on the broader policy diffusion literature in the study of American politics (Berry and
Berry 1990; Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Pacheco 2012; Volden 2006; Walker 1969), IR scholars
identify three causal mechanisms of diffusion: coercion, competition, and socialization (Elkins and
Simmons 2004; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006, 2007). Coercion theories attribute diffusion to
the purposive efforts of major international players (such as major powers, IOs, or nongovernmental
actors), who typically rely on such tools as economic conditionality (e.g., specific conditions that
states have to meet in order to join the IO) or even military interventions (Levitsky and Way
2005; Pevehouse 2002a,b, 2005). EU membership conditionality, as it related to minority treatment
in Slovakia and Romania, is an example of the former effect (Kelley 2004). An example of an
attempt at coercive diffusion of democratic institutions is the establishment of the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) following the US intervention in 2003.
Testing coercion theories, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, as such theories posit
conditional relationships that promise IO membership in exchange for democratization. While
such relationships are certainly possible, testing them is complicated by the need to identify the
relevant sample of states—states that are interested in adjusting their current behavior in order to
join an IO (Pevehouse 2005). In the absence of this type of data for a large-N study, the theoretical
and empirical scope of this paper is limited to the remaining two diffusion mechanisms—competition
and socialization.
Diffusion through Competition
Competition is one of the key causal mechanisms behind diffusion of norms, rules, behaviors, and
practices (Cao 2010; Simmons 2000; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006, 2007; Swank 2006). The
general argument is that firms and investors have a choice of where to take their business and, all else
equal, prefer low risk markets (Li 2006; Porta et al. 1997; Ramcharran 1999; Simmons 2000; Sobel
2002; Wei 2000). Aware of this preference, states compete for the benefits associated with attracting
international business by adopting one of two strategies: (1) enacting policies that mediate economic
risks, such as stronger property rights protections or improvement in democratic practices (Simmons
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2000; Jensen 2003) or (2) providing additional business incentives that would “make up” for the
losses associated with higher investment risks, such as lower capital taxation rates (Cao 2010; Li
2006). Both strategies suggest a certain degree of policy convergence among competing states.
Importantly, however, in this competition for international business and investment, not every
state is or views itself in direct competition with every other state. Operating in very different
domestic and international environments, states are unwilling and often unable to emulate certain
policy outcomes. Different policies work for different states: in the research on policy adoption
in American states, scholars have found that rather than comparing their state to the states that
are leaders in policy innovation, such as New York and California, or even to the national average,
legislators tend to look for cues in similar states—within the same geographical region, similar
socio-demographic characteristics, or even similar budgets (Volden 2006). California, for example,
is more likely to compare itself to New York or other large and diverse East coast states than more
geographically proximate Oregon or Nevada.
IR scholars identify similar patterns in behavior of international states. Policies diffuse as
a result of states’ attempts to win a prize, which could include various economic and political
benefits, such as attracting international business and investment, foreign aid, or memberships in
lucrative international agreements. Rather than global, this competition takes place among states
that fall within the same group of reference. The competition’s prize defines both the memberships
of these reference groups as well as the particular policies likely to diffuse.
Competition for international economic benefits, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) leads
to states’ convergence on policies related to the legal protections of commerce. Simmons (2000),
for example, argues that competition for FDI leads to convergence in states’ compliance with with
Article IIX of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) related to processing international bills
of payments. While a state’s reliability in processing of the international bills of payments is
certainly an important consideration, investors also look for other guarantees and protections, such
as freedom from government expropriations, seizures of assets, contract repudiation, and corruption
(Li and Resnick 2003). Referring to the domestic predatory practices as the level of domestic rule
of law, I argue that competition for international trade and investment leads to convergence in the
rule of law among the states that view each other as competitors.
As mentioned earlier, the set of competitors or the reference group is also defined by the com-
petition’s prize. Identifying the relevant groups of states that should exhibit convergence in the
levels of rule of law, then, requires exploring the logic behind the allocation of FDI. International
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investors recognize and take advantage of the risk/return ratios and their variation among the in-
vestment markets (e.g., Aizenman 2003; Jensen 2008). Some choose to diversify their investment
portfolios, while others specialize in particular types of investments. For instance, multinational
corporations (MNCs), operating within high production costs industries tend to forgo potentially
higher returns for greater market stability, while lower production costs may draw MNCs into more
risky environments (Aizenman 2003). Markets, characterized by high risk and high return, in other
words, are not in direct competition with low risk low return markets.
A quick and easy way to group international states in terms of expected risks and returns is
based on geographical proximity or regional memberships (Simmons 2000). As a rule, regional
memberships stands as a great proxy for similar economic, political and cultural development, as
well as factor endowments—all known determinants of investment risks and returns. A closer look,
however, reveals that, just like any proxy measure, geographical proximity performs relatively well
in clearcut cases, yet fails in a large number of theoretically interesting borderline cases. The
geographical approach alone struggles, for example, with separating the medium and low risk
Central and Eastern European markets, such as Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia,
from high risk countries, like Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. Moreover, a failure to consider factors
beyond geography would miss crucial changes in investment climates, such as the fall of the Soviet
Union, or accession to the EU, NAFTA, or other economic organizations. At the time of the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1990s, for example, investment opportunities in Poland compared to Ukraine
looked much different than in the early 2000s. Poland, whose economy was crumbling compared
to that of Ukraine during the late years of the Soviet Union, had experienced fast-paced economic
growth, transforming in a low risk investment state, a status further solidified by its accession to
the EU.
In sum, while regional geographic membership presents the most obvious reference group for
states to look to for policy cues, observation suggest that states with shared economic IO member-
ships may constitute an equally, if not more important reference. Further evidence comes from the
frequent use of fellow economic IO members as a reference of comparison by government officials,
daily news, and reports by various inter- and non-governmental organizations. Ukraine’s economic
or democratic performance, for example, is often assessed in the context of comparing it to Geor-
gia, Kazakhstan, or other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), (Business
Monitor International 2012; Caucasus Business Forecast Report 2012; Irkliyenko 2012). Likewise,
prospective investors and business partners often compare Venezuela to other Oil Producing and
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Exporting Countries (OPEC) states, such as Kuwait and Nigeria, rather than to its contiguous
neighbors (Calgary Herald 2008; Montinola and Jackman 2002).
By creating such reference groups for outside evaluators and, more importantly, for international
businesses and domestic political leaders, IOs bring what may otherwise be geographically distant
states into closer interaction and competition with one another, while at the same time increasing
the distance between the members and non-members. Member-states, however, do not start on
an even playing field when competing for the benefits associated with attracting international
business. In other words, states that end up within the same reference group due to their shared IO
membership may vary greatly in their attractiveness as trade partners or investment opportunities.
Since firms and investors are free to choose their business partners, less competitive member-states
(e.g., those with weaker property rights protection) run the risk of being passed up in favor of the
more attractive business opportunities.
Moreover, this competition within reference groups is not just implicit. Instead, the causal
process is well known to policy-entrepreneurs, who, in turn, explain the incentive structures to
legislators. Interviews with US lobbyists, for example, show evidence of frequent referencing of
policies within comparable states as an important strategy of policy-promotion (Volden 2006, 298).
Similar processes can be traced within international state policy-making. Russia’s Prime Minister
Dmitriy Medvedev, for example, used the reference mechanism by comparing Russia to other CIS
states, when justifying the decision to raise the limit for the cover for deposits insured by the
Russia’s Deposit Insurance Agency :
[. . . B]earing in mind the criterion for the correlation between per capita gross domestic
product and the volume of insurance cover for deposits, in our country indicators have
been lower than in many CIS states, including Kazakhstan and Ukraine, for instance
(Butrin, Mikhaylin and Cherkasov 2012, p. 9, emphasis added).
Similarly, in an address to domestic investors, Romanian Prime Minister Mihai-Razvan Ungure-
anu invoked two of such reference groups, by encouraging them to invest not just in the EU, but
also the CIS:
There is need for Romanian economic presence, for direct Romanian investment in other
states, which are not necessarily EU members, starting with the Republic of Moldova,
Ukraine, the Russian Federation - in fact the overall CIS [...] (BBC Monitoring Europe
2012, emphasis added).
In sum, by grouping states in accordance with their economic IO memberships in this way,
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governments, investors, and observers create reference groups. States within these reference groups
view themselves in direct competition for investment or other economic benefits, which leads to
them mimicking one another’s political and economic reforms. As a result of this process, after
some time states with shared IO memberships exhibit policy convergence, such as similar levels of
rule of law enforcement.6 This logic leads to the following research hypothesis:
Research Hypothesis: A state’s level of rule of law is positively affected by the average rule
of law of its fellow members in economic IOs.
Diffusion through Socialization
Socialization theory posits an alternative, yet complementary, causal mechanism for policy diffusion—
a mechanism that emphasizes the process of social learning (Elkins and Simmons 2004; Finnemore
1993; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006). The key distinct feature of socialization—defined
as “a change in beliefs” as a result of “exposure to new evidence, theories, or behavior reper-
toires”(Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006, 795)—is that, in contrast to the competition mecha-
nism, actors’ behavior is affected by others’ not because it alters their payoffs structure, but because
it provides information about available policy options (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2006). While
these policy options may or may not yield higher expected utility, what is important is that these
options become available either through passive interaction with others or as a result of active effort
of norm entrepreneurs.
Scholars sometimes distinguish between the processes of passive learning and active or channeled
learning (Elkins and Simmons 2004). Passive learning implies the process in which governments
adopt new policies as new policy options become available, e.g., as they are made aware of new
policy options as a result of observing policy processes in similar states (Elkins and Simmons 2004,
175-176). Within the democratization literature, the causal process associated with passive learning
is sometimes referred to as “demonstration effects.” The argument is that regimes become more
likely to democratize as their citizens get exposed to the images of “the good life” in democratic
states (Beissinger 2007; Mitchell 2002; Rawls 1999) or inspired by revolutionary experiences in
other states (Mitchell and Harrison 2012).
Channeled learning refers to policy learning in response to the efforts of norm entrepreneurs
or individuals or groups who actively promote the norm by providing training, information, and
6For a similar argument regarding diffusion of economic policies, see Cao (2009), Franzese and Hays (2008), Park
(2010), and Plu¨mper, Troeger and Winner (2009).
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resources (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). According to this argument, for example, democracy
diffusion occurs when pro-democracy activists within autocracies are able to form and maintain
strong links to sympathetic groups within democratic states (e.g., exile clusters, churches, human
rights organizations) (Bell, Clay and Murdie 2012; Checkel 1997; Greenhill 2010; Rosenau 2003).
These outside supporters promote democracy by lobbying their own governments to pressure the
autocratic regimes, as well as by providing the pro-democracy movements with economic resources,
information, training, and other types of support (Whitehead 1991, 1996).
Although promotion of democracy is not equivalent to the promotion of rule of law, there is cer-
tain overlap between these two concepts. Many aspects of rule of law, such as property protections
and contractual enforcement, are inseparable from the modern conceptualization of democracy,
which emphasizes legal protections for minorities and individuals more generally. Promotion of
democracy, therefore, comes hand in hand with the promotion of the rule of law.
A necessary feature of socialization is that this process requires that the targets of diffusion
be embedded in social networks which would transmit the relevant information among them. In
other words, the effectiveness of international policy entrepreneurs is constrained by their ability to
access to the pro-democracy groups within authoritarian regimes. For obvious logistical reasons, for
example, external actors have the greatest impact when they are located in a democratic state that
borders the targeted autocracy (Bell, Clay and Murdie 2012; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Levitsky
and Way 2005).
Shared IO membership also facilitates such access. By maintaining permanent headquarters
staffed with member representatives, or hosting regular international meetings among their mem-
bers, IOs provide one of the easiest and safest channels through which policy entrepreneurs can
access their target audiences—elites from corrupt authoritarian states. US criticism of Russia’s
presidential elections at the 2011 summit of the Organization of European Cooperation and Devel-
opment, for example, has been credited with triggering major anti-government protests in Russia
(McLaughlin 2012). Similarly, the Arab League took the lead in the negotiating with the Al-
Asad regime to allow international human rights observers into the protest-engulfed Syria (BBC
Monitoring Middle East 2011).
Pro-democracy protests are also commonplace outside of major IO headquarters, such the New
York office of the United Nations (Spencer and Miles 2008), and there is little doubt about other less
vocal and perhaps more effective interactions between pro-democracy entrepreneurs and member
representatives. The World Economic Forum in Davos, for example, explicitly facilitates such
10
interactions between government representatives from around the globe and social activists and
business leaders.
In addition, economic IOs themselves may take on the role of norm entrepreneurs with the goal
of promoting legal reform (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). More specifically, IO officials often view
the role of spreading norms as part of their mission. Many IOs, such as the World Bank and the
IMF, are rather explicit about this perceived role, especially as it comes to transmitting the norms
associated with the behavior of advanced market economies (Wade 1996), although diffusion of
political norms and principles became more explicitly emphasized with the end of the Cold War
(Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Perry 1996).
IOs have several tools that can be used to further the goal of policy promotion, such as creating
and/or sponsoring foreign exchange programs that educate elite students from corrupt authoritarian
countries at educational institutions in countries with strong rule of law (Perry 1996; Pevehouse
2005). In addition to providing the participants with rigorous education which enhances their
chance at obtaining important leadership positions in their country’s government, such programs
expose these future elites to the central principles of fuctioning market economies and democratic
governance. Hosting international conferences, workshops, sponsoring teacher exchanges, and other
forms of joint training between democratic and authoritarian countries constitute similar mecha-
nisms for diffusing democratic norms and values available to IOs. Other tools that may be used
by IOs to promote domestic reform are shaming or provision of material incentives, including sus-
pending membership (Donno 2010, 2012; Hathaway and Shapiro 2011; Kelley 2004; Murdie and
Davis 2012; Pevehouse 2005). Finally, IOs certainly play a passive role in spreading rule of law
by simply providing avenues for member interaction, exchange of information and ideas—a process
also known as “social contagion” (Wendt 1999).
Practically, separating the causal effects of passive social contagion from those of rival theories,
such as competition or channeled social diffusion is virtually impossible short of engaging in case
specific process tracing (Kelley 2004). This is not problematic for the purposes of this paper,
however, as both types of socialization act as complements to competition, fortifying the effect
posited in the research hypothesis: economic IOs provide channels of rule of law diffusion among
their member-states. In the next section, I will describe the research design aimed at testing the
research hypothesis, while controlling for a number of alternative explanations, such as geographical




I evaluate the research hypothesis, using a multi-parametric spatio-temporal least squares regression
(m-STAR). M-STAR treats state’s overlapping memberships in economic IOs, as well as geographic
contiguity—the main competing hypothesis—as spatial lags (Franzese and Hays 2007, 2008; Hays,
Kachi and Franzese 2010). This model provides for an adequate testing of diffusion hypotheses,
from both a methodological and a theoretical perspective. In contrast to other methodological
techniques that treat spatial and temporal dependence as a nuisance (e.g. fixed effects), m-STAR
permits explicit modeling and estimation of contemporaneous spatial effects, while also accounting
for the traditional unit-level effects (e.g., GDP per capita). The equation for the democracy diffusion







w2ijyj + . . .+ ρR
∑
j
wRijyj + φyi,t−1 +
∑
k
xikβk + ǫi, (1)
where yi is the dependent variable, and wij are spatial-level covariates, such as different types
of shared IO membership or contiguity, and ρ are the corresponding spatial weight coefficient to
estimate.7 Note that for each observation, yi, a spatial lag wijyi is simply a weighted sum of the
dependent variable’s values in all units yj other than i—a straightforward way to capture state i’s
dependence on outcomes in other states. Temporal dependence is captured by including a standard
temporal lag yi,t−1, with φ as its coefficient. Finally, the model includes a set of traditional unit-level
covariates x with coefficients β, that enter as control variables, and the error term ǫi.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable—state i’s domestic level of rule of law—is measured in two alternative ways:
(1) using the L&S measure of rule of law, and (2) S&P ratings of countries’ international credit-
worthiness. L&S use a Bayesian factor analysis model to construct a latent rule of law measure, that
synthesizes information from several existing datasets, such as Henisz (2000), CIRI by Cingranelli
and Richards (2010), and Tate and Keith (2007). This measurement approach remedies several
known problems, associated with measuring rule of law, such as temporal dependence, boundedness,
substantial missingness, and measurement error (Linzer and Staton 2012; R´ıos-Figueroa and Staton
7That is, if w1ij represents the spatial weight for High Capacity IOs, then w
1
ij is an NxN matrix whose ij
th cell
entry is the number of shared high capacity IO memberships between i and j, and ρ1 is the spatial effect coefficient
to estimate.
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2012). The intuition behind such a measurement strategy is to “average out” the differences among
the existing rule of law measures, while also reporting a measure of variance, which captures
uncertainty or lack of inter-coder reliability. The resulting measure is a ratio ranging from 0 to
1, with higher numbers associated with stronger rule of law level. The measure spans 200 states
between 1960-2009 (Linzer and Staton 2012).
I also measure the dependent variable using S&P international credit ratings (Standard and
Poor’s Ratings Services 2013). S&P Ratings Services is a leading provider of credit ratings, as well
as other types of data, research, and risk analysis to international banks, investors, researchers,
and policy practitioners. S&P credit ratings measure ranges from 0 to 1, with higher numbers
indicating stronger rule of law, and covers 63 countries between 1986-2001. Although limited in
coverage, S&P measure provides a robustness check, as well as a “reality check” of the results
against the picture seen by real-world practitioners.
Both measures of the dependent variable are first differenced and multiplied by 100, produc-
ing scores with a potential range between 0 and 100. Taking a first difference simply involves a
subtraction of previous year’s score from the current year. As the result of these transformations,
both dependent variables are measures of percentage point change in rule of law. Using change in
rule of law, rather than the raw level, alleviates the self-selection concerns that states with similar
levels of rule of law tend to join the same economic IOs. Measuring rule of law in terms of change
allows to instead focus on testing whether a state adjusts its rule of law in response to changes in
the average rule of law of its fellow economic IO members—the relationship posited in the research
hypothesis. In addition, first differencing ensures that the statistical results are not driven by the
cross-sectional variation in the rule of law, but are instead derived from both temporal and cross-
sectional variation. The variation in the dependent variable measured in terms of change comes,
in other words, from the panels of countries with over-time variation in rule of law, while panels of
countries that did not experience changes in the rule of law during the period under investigation
score “0” on the dependent variable and do not contribute to the likelihood.
Independent Variables
This paper posits a spatial relationship between a state’s level of rule of law and the average rule of
law or its fellow IO members. To appropriately model this effect, the central independent variable
of interest is measured as a spatial lag rather than as state-level covariates (Beck, Gleditsch and
Beardsley 2006; Franzese and Hays 2008; Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010).
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The data on states’ memberships in economic IOs comes from Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom
(2004). The spatial lag variable, capturing the average rule of law of a state’s fellow members in
economic IOs, is constructed as a series of t NtxNt matrices, in which N represents the number of
states for each year of observation t. Each cell itjt of each matrix represents the number of shared
economic IOs between states i and j in year t, divided by i’s total shared memberships in that
year.8
For example, suppose state A is a member of two IOs: IO1 made up of states A, B, C, and D;
and IO2 made up of states A, B, and E (see Figure 1).
The spatial matrix of joint IO memberships in this example can be summarized in the following
way:
A B C D E
A 0 2 1 1 1
B 2 0 1 1 1
C 1 1 0 1 0
D 1 1 0 1 0
E 1 1 0 0 0
To standardize by rows, we simply divide each cell by the row total, obtaining the following
weights matrix:
8Dividing the cell values by the row total is also referred to as row-standardization. Row-standardization is a
standard approach to constructing spatial lags (Franzese and Hays 2008; Hays, Kachi and Franzese 2010; Plumper
and Neumayer 2010).
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A B C D E
A 0 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
B 0.4 0 0.2 0.2 0.2
C 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0
D 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0
E 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
In accordance to this standardization approach, the spatial lag for state A is:
wAyj = 0.4∗(Rule of Law)B+0.2∗(Rule of Law)C+0.2∗(Rule of Law)D+0.2∗(Rule of Law)E . (2)
Note that the diagonal entries of each matrix represent a state’s number of shared IO member-
ships with itself and are coded as “0.” To account for self-contagion, or the temporal dependence
in the level of rule of law, the statistical model includes a one-year lagged rule of law measure (the
raw value rather than the change in value).9
Control Variables
The statistical model accounts for geographical diffusion, which is the main alternative diffusion
mechanism, posited by the previous literature on rule of law (e.g., Simmons 2000). This is done
by controlling for the average rule of law of a state’s contiguous neighbors, Geography, constructed
according to the process described above. Data on geographical contiguity is obtained from the
Correlates of War (COW) Project (Stinnett et al. 2002).
In order to demonstrate diffusion, it is also necessary to rule out the possible “common exposure”
explanations, which attribute convergence in the rule of law to the effect of either a common
system-level variable or similar domestic conditions. Scholars have linked rule of law to the level of
democracy, arguing that rule of law may only persist in states with strong limits on the government
(Weingast 1997). I model this by controlling for Polity Change, measured as the first difference of
the 21-point Polity II variable (Marshall and Jaggers 2008). I expect that changes in Polity score
will be positively correlated with the changes in the rule of law.
Rule of law enforcement is costly. It requires training and maintaining an adequate police,
judicial, and penitentiary systems. Hence, I control for Economic Growth, measured as a logged
9The temporal lag of the actual value of rule of law rather than the first difference is included to account for the
effect of “diminishing returns”: i.e., states with already strong rule of law have less room for improvement than states
with weak rule of law.
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first difference in GDP/capita (in constant USD, 2000). I expect a positive relationship between
the economic growth and improvements in the rule of law (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Rodrik, Subra-
manian and Trebbi 2002). This data comes from the World Development Indicators (World Bank
2005).
States whose economies depend on international trade and investment have a stronger incentive
to enforce rule of law, as state’s ability to attract and retain international business hinges on its
level of property protection, contract enforcement, as well as banking and insurance laws (Souva,
Smith and Rowan 2008). To model this, I control for changes in trade volumes Trade, measured
as a logged and first differenced sum of imports and exports in a given year (in millions, constant
USD, 2000). I also control for change in Net FDI inflows, which is measured as FDI inflows minus
FDI outflows in a given year, logged and first differenced (in millions, constant USD, 2000). Data
on Trade is constructed using COW Trade data (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009), while FDI data
comes from the World Development Indicators.
Scholars have demonstrated that British colonies have been more successful at establishing
domestic legal institutions, due to the peculiarities of the common law system over other legal
systems (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Mitchell, Ring and Spellman 2013). I control for this by
including an indicator variable of whether a state is a former British colony.
Finally, rule of law, just like other political institutions, are not impervious to political shocks
and upheavals, such as international or civil wars. I model this by controlling for whether a state
in involved in an International or Civil War is a given year. This data is obtained from the COW
Project (Ghosn and Bennett 2003; Sarkees 2000).
Empirical Analysis
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Table 1. The first two models are estimated
using L&S rule of law data, while models 3 and 4 employ S&P rating. To isolate the effects of the
main theoretical variable—shared economic IO memberships—from mere geographical diffusion, I
first estimate a model, which includes just the control variables and the Contiguity variable (Models
1 and 3 of Table 1). Then I re-estimate the model with the addition of the Economic IOs variable
(Models 2 and 4 of Table 1).
The bottom part of the table presents the coefficients on the spatial lags of Economic IOs and
Contiguity. Just like in traditional regression analysis, we interpret the direction of spatial effects
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Table 1: The Effect of Contiguity and Shared Economic IO Memberships on Rule of Law
Rule of Law (Linzer and Staton) Standard and Poor Ratings
Rule of Law (t-1) −0.005∗∗∗(0.001) −0.004∗∗∗(0.001) −0.010 (0.007) −0.010 (0.007)
Polity Change 0.428∗∗∗(0.019) 0.414∗∗∗(0.019) 0.088 (0.159) 0.092 (0.158)
Trade 0.403∗ (0.221) 0.201 (0.215) 1.896 (1.674) 1.258 (1.700)
GDP Growth 0.013∗ (0.007) 0.017∗∗ (0.007) 0.333∗∗∗(0.052) 0.336∗∗∗(0.051)
Interstate War −0.152 (0.428) −0.119 (0.415) −8.700∗∗∗(2.213) −8.415∗∗∗(2.208)
Civil War −0.469∗∗∗(0.119) −0.505∗∗∗(0.115) −1.386∗∗ (0.569) −1.423∗∗ (0.566)
Net FDI −0.020 (0.154) 0.028 (0.150) 0.745∗ (0.385) 0.741∗ (0.383)
British Colony −0.073 (0.084) −0.128 (0.082) 0.289 (0.366) 0.297 (0.364)
Constant 0.631∗ (0.365) 0.416 (0.354) 1.493 (1.026) 1.556 (1.022)
Spatial Effects
Contiguity 0.062∗∗ (0.029) −0.045 (0.031) 0.057 (0.048) 0.026 (0.051)
Economic IOs 0.074∗∗∗(0.007) 0.061∗ (0.032)
σ 1.583∗∗∗(0.027) 1.535∗∗∗(0.027) 3.596∗∗∗(0.116) 3.580∗∗∗(0.116)
N 1680 1680 479 479
Note: ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
by looking at the signs on the coefficients. In Model 1, the coefficient on Contiguity is positive and
statistically significant, which suggests that a state is likely to strengthen its rule of law in response
to positive changes in the average rule of law of its contiguous neighbors. This positive effect on
Contiguity disappears, however, once we add the Economic IOs variable (Model 2). In Model 2,
the effect of Economic IOs is positive and statistically significant, while the effect of Contiguity
is no longer statistically significant. The coefficient on Economic IOs in Model 2 is also greater
in absolute value than the coeffient on Contiguity in either Model 1 or 2. This suggests that the
statistical significance on Contiguity in Model 1 may be simply due to the omitted variable bias:
when we omit the real driving factor of rule of law diffusion—Economic IOs—its effect is partially
picked up by Contiguity—a related, yet different concept.
The results presented in Models 3 and 4, which estimate the effects of the same covariates
on the S&P ratings, provide some additional evidence in favor of diffusion through economic IOs.
The effect of Contiguity is not statistically significant either when modeled by itself (Model 3)
or in conjunction with Economic IOs. The effect of Economic IOs is positive and statistically
significant, suggesting once again that states tend to improve their own credit ratings in reaction to
the improvement in the average credit ratings of the states, with shared memberships in economic
IOs. Models 3 and 4 provide a great robustness check on the empirical results. It is important to
remember, however, that these models are based on a more limited sample of states, and as a result,
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Table 2: Wald’s F-Tests Comparing
the Effects of Economic IOs and Con-
tiguity Spatial Lags
L&S Different from Contiguity 12.08∗∗∗
S&P Different from Contiguity 0.26
Note: ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Cells represent χ2 statistics of the cor-
responding tests of equivalence.
are associated with lower statistical power—a possible explanation for the lack of significance on
several variables, including Contiguity.
The difference in the effects of Economic IOs and Contiguity in Models 2 and 4 is further
explored using post-estimation F-tests (Table 2). For Model 2, the F-statistic is positive and sta-
tistically significant. This means that the coefficient on Economic IOs is statistically different from
that of Geography : states that share economic IO memberships exhibit stronger spatial dependence
in their levels of rule of law than geographically contiguous states. There is no evidence, however,
of a similar pattern in Model 4, in which rule of law is measured using S&P ratings. For Model 4,
and F-test provides no evidence of a statistical difference between the effects of Economic IOs and
Contiguity. The lack of statistical significance, however, may be attributed to the lack of statistical
power.
When interpreting spatial effects, one must also keep in mind that the coefficients represent only
the initial pre-dynamic effects or the effect of covariates in the absence of spatial feedback (Franzese
and Hays 2007). As is the case with any lagged dependent variable, effects of spatial variables are
nonlinear; they enter the model as multipliers on the neighbors’ values of the dependent variable.
As a result, these variables have non-constant marginal effects that change (1) with the changes
in neighbors’ dependent variables, (2) with unit i’s own changes on the dependent variable in the
previous time period, (3) and over time. Therefore, interpreting the marginal effects of the spatial
coefficients requires calculating their substantive effects (Franzese and Hays 2008; Hays, Kachi
and Franzese 2010). An example of the substantive effect of joining an economic IO, all else held
constant, is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows the hypothetical effect of including an average size and income European country
(such as Poland in 2000) into an economic IO made up predominantly of states with strong rule
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Note: Predicted effects are generated using Monte Carlo simulations, based on values for 2001
or the last year, for which the data is available. Red lines represent predicted change in rule of
law, assuming Poland joined the EU at time t=1 (the spatial weights matrix of shared economic
IO membership has been modified as if Poland was included in the EU in year t= 1). Blue lines
represent predicted rule of law, assuming Poland did not join the EU at time t=1 (unmodified
spatial weights matrix of shared economic IO memberships as of 2001).
of law (such as the EU), while holding constant all other variables.10 We see that although the
initial effect of this additional membership is small—approximately 0.1 points on 100-point rule
of law scale—it grows substantially stronger over time, reaching 1-4 points—more than a tenfold
increase—after ten time periods, and about 2-5 points after twenty time periods. This result has
some face validity, as it supports the more general view of diffusion as a slow and gradual process,
rather than a fast and easy outcome (Berndt and Woods 2013a,b).
Note that this is an isolated effect of joining a single economic IO. In practice, this effect would
likely be much stronger, as joining one IO usually leads to joining a set of other IOs with similar
memberships. For example, recent joiners of the EU also frequently join the Council of Europe and
10The choice of Poland for this demonstration is not accidental, as Poland indeed joined the EU, albeit in 2004. I
construct the demonstration using the data from 2000, as this is the last year, for which the data is available on all
variables in the empirical model.
19
the OECD, either concurrently or within close temporal proximity (Pevehouse 2005). Each such
additional IO membership makes an independent contribution to the spatial effect’s substantive
strength.
The control variables act as expected, replicating the findings of the previous literature. The
coefficient on the lagged value of the rule of law is negative and statistically significant in the
first two models: states with higher levels of rule of law in the previous year are less likely to
experience positive changes. Such decreasing marginal returns are common to many indicators,
such as democracy or economic growth. The coefficient on Polity Change is positive and statistically
significant in the first two models, suggesting that improvements in democracy tend to be associated
with improvements in the rule of law. Trade is positive and statistically significant in Model 1,
suggesting that increases in trade volumes lead to improvements in the rule of law. GDP Growth
is positive and statistically significant in all models, which implies that rule of law enforcement
requires strong economic capabilities. As expected, Interstate and Civil War have a negative effect
on the rule of law, as war undermines domestic institutional capabilities. Finally, when measured
as S&P credit ratings, rule of law is positively affected by increases in Net FDI.
Conclusion
International actors do not exist in a political vacuum. By engaging in trade, forming alliances,
or joining IOs, states come into contact with one another, and this contact is not inconsequential
for their domestic behavior. Inter-dependence between international interactions and domestic
outcomes has been recognized by scholars for quite some time. Yet, until recently, it has been rarely
explicitly modeled or accounted for in empirical analyses, primarily due to the lack of appropriate
methodological tools.11 This paper accomplishes this task by exploring diffusion of the rule of law
through economic IOs, using a spatial econometrics approach.
Theoretically, this paper develops two complementary causal mechanisms of diffusion: compe-
tition and socialization. Both theoretical approaches expect convergence in the rule of law levels
among states with shared memberships in economic IOs. According to the competition theory,
shared IO memberships provide reference groups that are used to evaluate states’ investment cli-
mate. International investors and firms use such reference groups in making important business
decisions, such as how and where to allocate their funds. This creates incentives for states with
11For exceptions, see Crescenzi (2007), and Lee, Muncaster and Zinnes (1994).
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shared IO memberships to compete against one another for these lucrative economic opportunities.
As a result, IO members converge on the political and economic outcomes related to attracting
investment—or the level of the rule of law—an umbrella term used here to refer to such domestic
factors as enforcement of contracts, property rights, protections against expropriation, and other
violations. Socialization theory posits a complementary causal process, arguing that legal norms
diffuse through social interaction among economic and political elites. IOs provide the fora for such
interaction, facilitating elites exchanges, or work by policy entrepreneurs.
This paper’s theoretical framework is rather intuitive, not only for the scholars of IR, but also
for ordinary citizens, such as those who gathered in Ukraine’s Independence Square in fall 2013—
winter 2014 to demand that their government sign an EU Association treaty, which promised a
break from pervasive lawlessness and corruption. The empirical results provide support for the
theory. Shared memberships in economic IOs exhibit a positive effect on rule of law—an effect that
crowds out that of mere geographical contiguity. The regression estimates are supplemented by
the analysis of substantive effects, which shows that that the effect of IO membership on rule of
law grows consistently and substantially over-time. The findings fit with the more general view of
democratic diffusion as a gradual process, rather than an instantaneous outcome.
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